INCET invites for its next research seminar entitled "Does Domination Require Unequal Power?" by Callum Macrae. The meeting takes place on 22nd of February at 5:30 p.m., room 25, Grodzka 52 and via MS Teams.

Abstract

According to some conceptions of domination, domination cannot occur in conditions of equal power. On this sort of understanding, domination just is a kind of objectionable power asymmetry—domination is what happens when a power asymmetry lacks the sort of special justification that would make it acceptable. According to other conceptions of domination, domination can occur in conditions of equal power. On this sort of understanding, domination is a kind of objectionable dependence—dependence on an arbitrary or uncontrolled will—and though that sort of objectionable dependence will often occur in contexts of unequal power, it need not, and so domination in conditions of equal power will be possible. In this paper I argue in favour of the unequal power conception; I argue that when we have arbitrary will dependence without unequal power there are good reasons not to apply the concept of domination to the relationships we find. There can be no domination without unequal power. Moreover, I argue that recognising this has a series of significant implications for our understanding of domination’s broader place in contemporary political philosophy, and of the relationship between republican and relational egalitarian accounts of the demands of political morality. 

Teams link:

https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_ZTVkNTg3MTktMTFmYy00NzJjLWFlYzUtMWQ1MDJiM2IxNDUz%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22eb0e26eb-bfbe-47d2-9e90-ebd2426dbceb%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22e54831ec-c6d7-4adf-a368-d029d742fcdf%22%7d